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After Dinner Remarks
JUSTICE STEPHEN G. BREYER
For several days this month (February 2007), we judges (eight Justices and two Advo-
cate Generals of the European Court of Justice and seven Justices of the Supreme Court
of the United States) have met together and discussed a host of relevant topics. We are
grateful to the members of the faculty at the SMU Dedman School of Law and the Yale
Law School, who have helped to organize these productive discussions. The last few days
have brought to my own mind three images.
The first is a recollection dating from the time of 9/11. On that day, Justice O'Connor
and I were in India. She was on the airplane at the time of the attack. Joanna and I had
arrived the day before. We were going to see Indian judges. After the attack, the Ameri-
can Ambassador tried to send us home. But I thought that neither Sandra nor I would
agree to go home without trying to do what we came to do. Of course, I was right.
What struck me particularly about that visit was not simply the tremendous wave of
support that came from Indian judges and lawyers. I suddenly began to see that the true
division of importance in the world is not between different countries or different conti-
nents. The difference of importance is between those who are committed to reason-to
working things out, to understanding other people, to the peaceful resolution of differ-
ences-and those who are not. People committed to reason are committed to what we
call civilization or the rule of law. Unfortunately, not everyone is committed to these
noble goals. Formidable forces of unreason actively work against these values. The law-
yers and the judges are on the right side of the divide. They are on the right side in India.
They are on the right side in the United States of America. They are on the right side of
this conflict in every country in the world.
The second image is an image of groups of professionals from different nations together
weaving a fabric-a legal fabric that helps to increase the power of those who believe and
reason and that helps to shield us against unreason's force. In helping to weave this fabric,
we lawyers and judges act not as politicians or even statesmen. Rather, we act as profes-
sionals. We do our professional jobs irrespective of politics.
Of course, the notion of weaving a fabric is a classical image. It reminds me of my
efforts to read Virgil's Aeneid in Mr. McCarthy's high school Latin class. My fallible
memory tells me that Aeneas emerged from the turbulent seas, shipwrecked on the Lib-
yan coast, to find men and women at work building a city, rather like a colony of bees.
Some few weeks after 9-11 I began to understand the power of Virgil's image. Joanna and
I had the opportunity to visit the devastated site. Looking down upon it from a neighbor-
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ing building, we saw construction workers, sanitation workers, and health workers busy
clearing and repairing. We saw before us an example of a basic reasonable human instinct,
the instinct constructively to build and to repair. That, too, underlies our joint profes-
sional efforts to knit or to weave a legal fabric that will work well for the people whom our
laws affect.
Certainly, there are many important differences among the laws of our different na-
tions. But there are more important similarities. Nations throughout the world to an ever
greater extent support judicial independence. They do so in part because they believe
such judiciaries can help in turn to support what I have called the forces of reason.
At the time our Constitution was written, Alexander Hamilton argued that an indepen-
dent judiciary was necessary to enforce our Constitution's provisions. Without that inde-
pendence, the Constitution would bend like a reed before the prevailing political winds.
Americans would resolve their problems with bayonets, not law.' That was 200 years ago;
and it has taken us almost as long to understand the importance of that independence.
Consider the following cases:
In the 1830s the Supreme Court decided Worcester v. Georgia.' Georgia had found gold
on the Cherokee Indian land; Georgia had taken the land; and the Indians had sued. The
Cherokees won, but they did not get their land back. Instead, President Andrew Jackson
supposedly said, "John Marshall made his decision; now let him enforce it."3 And the
President sent troops to Georgia to evict the Indians. The Cherokees walked the "Trail of
Tears" to Oklahoma where the descendants of those who survived live to this day.
In the 1960s, the Court decided Cooper v. Aaron.4 Orville Faubus, the Governor of
Arkansas stood in a Little Rock schoolhouse door and said (despite Brown v. Board of
Education declaring racial segregation unconstitutional) that his state militia would prevent
black children from entering the all white Central High School. President Dwight Eisen-
hower then sent paratroopers instructed to enforce a court integration order. The para-
troopers acted to enforce the law. I can remember those very brave black children, taken
by the paratroopers' hands, walking into that school. That public decision to support the
law made the day a great day for judicial independence, for law, and for the United States
of America. In Cooper v. Aaron, all nine Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States signed an opinion insisting that the school desegregate. But not nine, not 900, not
9,000 justices could have brought about compliance had the President of the United States
not ordered the paratroopers to enforce the law. (I add that the wife of Chief Ross, the
Cherokee's Chief at the time of Worcester, died on her trip to Oklahoma and is buried
close to Little Rock's Central High School.)
Our Court continues to make decisions, for example, in areas of school prayer, abor-
tion, even Bush v. Gore.5 Many think they are wrongly decided. (Indeed, I was in the
dissent in Bush v. Gore.) Many of these decisions are unpopular. Emotions may run high.
Yet, today there is no need for paratroopers; there are no rocks, no stones thrown in the
streets. The public generally accepts the Court's decisions as law even when they disagree
1. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
3. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE UNION AT RISK: JACKSONIAN DEMocRAcy, STATES' RIGHTS, AND THE
NULLIFICATION CRISIS 118-19 (1987).
4. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
5. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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with the Court and feel strongly about it. And when I refer to the public, I do not mean a
few thousand judges or even a million lawyers. I mean 300 million Americans. It took a
Civil War, eighty years of legal segregation, and many ups and downs to bring Americans
to the point where an ingrained habit-acceptance of the law as courts determine it-
avoids the need for paratroopers while assuring respect for the law.
I refer specifically to our own "rule of law" history because it reflects the difficulties we
all face when trying to establish the rule of law throughout the world. Yet "globalization,"
while a clich6, is also a reality. And that reality makes the effort to establish and to main-
tain a rule of law a pressing task.
We benefit from mutual discussion as we share that task in part because we judges are
ever more likely to have to take account of the laws of other nations. I looked specifically
at our docket of a few years ago. And I found that more than half a dozen cases, out of
about seventy cases, involved foreign laws. In one case, an antitrust case, we had to decide
whether an Ecuadorian plaintiff could sue a Dutch defendant in the United States about a
cartel which had one American member and many more members who were not Ameri-
cans. 6 To answer that question properly, we had to know something about the antitrust
law of the European Union. In another case, the plaintiff, Mrs. Altman, brought suit in
Los Angeles to obtain six Klimt paintings that the Nazis had taken from her uncle and
given to the Austrian national museum. The question before us was whether the museum
could assert a defense of sovereign immunity. To answer the question we had to under-
stand how the concept -sovereign immunity - is used throughout the world. (I found
helpful a French Court of Appeals decision in which the court held that, despite an asser-
tion of sovereign immunity, ex-King Farouk had to pay Christian Dior for his wife's
dresses; the French court pointed out that he was no longer King).7 We found knowledge
of foreign law useful or necessary in cases involving document discovery (claimed useful
for a presentation to the European cartel authority), the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA),8 and a tort case based on an old federal statute that provided dam-
ages for those harmed by pirates (who are today's pirates?). Germany, Japan, the Euro-
pean Union, filed briefs in some of these cases. Indeed, we are dependent upon good
briefing to find good answers; the lawyers who write those briefs will have to learn ever
more about how to find answers to foreign law questions. And that means, we will need
cooperation among all three parts of our profession, academia, bench, and bar, to perform
an effective judicial task in this increasingly globalized world.
In part, globalization calls to our attention a similarity of attitude among those whom
the law effects. This fact was brought home to me when I participated in discussions
celebrating the 100th anniversary of the French Civil Code. After a day and a half of
formal presentations the conference organizers opened the floor for questions. There
were three questions. The first questioner asked, "Since we have modified the Civil Code
to recognize the equal rights of women, why have I not seen any women on the program?"
The second asked, "How should we modify the law to reflect the fact that we are part of
Europe, develop a new French Code, a new European Code, some kind of mixture?" The
third, referring to the values of democracy, equality, and individual rights that underlie the
6. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
7. Ex-King Farouk of Egypt v. Christian Dior, 84 Clunet 717, 24 I.L.R. 228 (CA Paris 1957).
8. Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004).
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Code, asked, "How do we pass those values on to the next generation?" In my own mind,
I asked a geographical question. Could I not have heard somewhat similar questions
raised in San Francisco, Boston, Des Moines, or Chicago?
My final image is personal. Some years ago I worked for Senator Kennedy when he was
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. (I was Chief Counsel).9 At a later reunion,
I heard Senator Kennedy tell his 300 or more former staff members that his father had
taught him that a worthwhile goal in life was to gather together men and women of differ-
ent abilities, with different talents, from different professions, who do not necessarily all
think alike-and help. Help who? Help others; help a cause; help each other accomplish
something as well. When I consider the conversations of the past few days, I believe I
have seen an example of professional people trying to help, to help each other achieve
public goals. We did not order, or decide, or negotiate. We participated in a conversa-
tion. We listened. As Michael Oakeshott pointed out years ago, a conversation is not a
contest or a debate that can be won or lost. Its value lies in a residue left in the mind; a
residue that may prove useful some time in the future. Given a world where more and
more people face ever more similar problems, where they look to law for answers, where
they place hope and trust in judicial institutions, where judges, like others, are rarely cer-
tain about how to find legal answers to many common problems, but where judges, law-
yers, and ordinary citizens know they are on the side of that reason that is the law, this
kind of conversation may prove one of the best ways for each of us to help each other as
we set about our common task.
This is why I am grateful for the opportunity to have participated in the discussions of
the past few days. Thank you.
9. United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, http:J/judiciary.senate.gov/ (last visited Nov. 2,
2007).
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